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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case 
The State has conceded on appeal that the facts alleged in the indictment failed 
to support the charge of sexual abuse of a minor, and the facts established at trial were 
insufficient to prove sexual abuse of a minor; and therefore this Court should vacate 
Jeffrey Truman's conviction for this count. (Respondent's Brief, pp.4-5.) Therefore, the 
remaining issues for this Court are whether: (1) the district court erroneously admitted 
highly prejudicial prior bad acts evidence against Mr. Truman; (2) the prosecutor 
committed misconduct rising to the level of a fundamental error when the prosecutor 
elicited testimony that was deemed inadmissible prior to trial; and (3) whether these 
errors, both individually and cumulatively, warrant a new trial for Mr. Truman's 
remaining conviction for lewd conduct with a minor. 
This Reply Brief is necessary to clarify Mr. Truman's argument on appeal. This 
brief is further necessary to respond to the State's legal claims on appeal. While 
Mr. Truman continues to assert that the cumulative effect of the trial errors in his case 
warrants a new trial on the charge of lewd conduct, he will rely on the argument 
presented in his Appellant's Brief, and will not reiterate those arguments herein. 
Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedings 
The Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedings were previously 
articulated in Mr. Truman's Appellant's Brief. They need not be repeated in this Reply 
Brief, but are incorporated herein by reference thereto. 
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ISSUES 
1. Did the district court err when it admitted prior bad acts evidence pursuant to 
I.R.E. 404(b) against Mr. Truman? 
2. Did the prosecutor commit misconduct, rising to the level of a fundamental error, 
when the prosecutor elicited testimony in violation of the district court's order that 
deemed testimony regarding J.R.'s mental condition inadmissible because it was 
irrelevant? 
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ARGUMENT 
I. 
The District Court Erred When It Admitted Prior Bad Acts Evidence Against Mr. Truman 
A. Introduction 
The State raises four primary contentions in response to Mr. Truman's allegation 
that the district court erred when it admitted prior bad acts evidence against him at trial. 
First, the State asserts that the Idaho Supreme Court Opinion in State v. Grist1 
established a new rule of law in Idaho with regard to admissibility of I.R.E. 404(b) 
evidence, and therefore the district court could not have erred in failing to anticipate this 
change. Second, the State claims that Mr. Truman has failed to adequately identify the 
evidence that he is objecting to on appeal. Third, the State alleges that Mr. Truman 
invited the error of the introduction of this prior bad acts evidence. And finally, the State 
asserts that this evidence was admissible in order to show the res gestae of the 
charged offense or to demonstrate a common scheme or plan. 
With regard to the State's assertion that Mr. Truman has not adequately 
identified the facts in the record with regard to his assertion that the district court erred 
when it admitted prior bad acts against him, Mr. Truman disputes this claim. However, 
should this Court think additional clarification regarding Mr. Truman's assertions on 
appeal is warranted, Mr. Truman will take this opportunity to provide further elaboration. 
See I.A.R. 35(c). 
As to the remainder of the State's arguments on appeal, Mr. Truman asserts that 
they are without merit. 
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B. Clarification Of Mr. Truman's Claims On Appeal With Regard To The Erroneous 
Introduction Of LR.E. 404(b) Evidence 
On appeal, the State has asserted that Mr. Truman has not identified with 
sufficient clarity the erroneously admitted evidence that he is challenging on appeal. 
(Respondent's Brief, p.9.) Mr. Truman disputes this claim, as he has set forth in detail 
all of the relevant testimony that was provided at trial regarding allegations of uncharged 
misconduct and has identified with specificity those aspects of the district court's ruling 
regarding the LR.E. 404(b) evidence that he is challenging on appeal. (See Appellant's 
Brief, pp .4-7, 19-26.) 
However, out of an abundance of caution should this Court deem a more 
concrete articulation of the disputed other-acts evidence to be necessary, Mr. Truman 
will take this opportunity to provide additional clarification. See LA.R. 35(c). 
Mr. Truman has challenged two main types of LR.E. 404(b) evidence that were 
admitted at trial: that involving alleged and uncharged sexual activity between himself 
and T.S., and that involving alleged and uncharged sexual activity between himself and 
another adult, J.R., who apparently suffered from some form of developmental disability. 
(Appellant's Brief, pp.19-26.) 
The evidence challenged on appeal by Mr. Truman regarding J.R. was presented 
through the testimony of three main witnesses: Elizabeth LaFranier, J.R., and T.S. 
Ms. LaFranier testified regarding the fact that J.R., "used to live in the state school, 
Idaho State School and Hospital, and we have a PCS home, and she resides with us." 
(Trial Tr., p.168, Ls.1-5.) She further testified that J.R. would stay at Mr. Truman's 
1 State v. Grist, 147 Idaho 49,205 P.3d 1185 (2009). 
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home occasionally because J.R., "can't be left alone." (Trial Tr., p.170, L.24 - p.171, 
L.8.) 
J.R. also testified at trial. According to her testimony, Mr. Truman had shown 
J.R. his genitalia on unspecified occasions, watched pornography with her, and J.R. 
further testified that she had performed oral sex on Mr. Truman. (Trial Tr., p.205, L.21 -
p.206, L.19.) 
The last person who testified regarding allegations of sexual activity between 
Mr. Truman and J.R. was T.S. She testified that J.R. went in to Mr. Truman's bedroom 
while he was watching pornography. (Trial Tr., p.267, L.10 - p.270, L.4.) J.R. then 
began touching Mr. Truman's penis, according to T.S.'s testimony. (Trial Tr., p.270, 
Ls.1-4.) T.S. then testified that Mr. Truman asked her to film himself and J.R. 
performing sexual acts on one another. (Trial Tr., p.270, Ls.5-8.) According to T.S., 
she originally left the room, but then she returned and observed J.R. performing oral sex 
on Mr. Truman. (Trial Tr., p.270, Ls.5-24.) In addition, T.S. claimed that both she and 
J.R. performed oral sex on Mr. Truman at a later time that same evening. (Trial 
Tr., p.272, Ls.1-19.) T.S. further testified about at least one other instance of uncharged 
prior sexual conduct between herself, J.R. and Mr. Truman. (Trial Tr., p.282, L.24 -
p.283, L.15.) 
With regard to the uncharged acts evidence regarding Mr. Truman and T.S., this 
evidence was first referenced by the State in its opening statement. (Trial Tr., p.153, 
Ls.15-21.) During trial, T.S. testified as to allegations of uncharged conduct between 
Mr. Truman and herself occurring up to 18 months prior to the alleged incident of lewd 
conduct on December 5,2007. (Trial Tr., p.266, L.12 - p.273, L.9.) According to her 
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testimony, Mr. Truman began asking T.S. questions about sex when she was 
approximately 12 years old and suggested to her that he was available if there were any 
questions she had or if she wanted to "experiment" with him sexually. (Trial Tr., p.266, 
L.12 - p.267, L.9.) 
In addition, T.S. testified that, between the occasion where she and J.R. 
allegedly took turns performing oral sex on Mr. Truman and the time of the alleged lewd 
conduct charge, there were additional acts of sexual conduct between her and 
Mr. Truman. (Trial Tr., p.272, L.20 - p.285, L.25.) This testimony included a fairly 
extensive description of at least one prior sexual encounter, an occasion during which 
T.S. alleged that Mr. Truman had shown her pornography on a computer, and an 
attempt at vaginal intercourse. (Trial Tr., p.274, L.19 - p.285, L.25.) 
C. The Idaho Supreme Court Did Not Announce A New Rule In Grist, And 
Subsequent Decisions From The Idaho Supreme Court And Idaho Court Of 
Appeals Have Consistently Applied This Opinion To District Court Determinations 
Made In Reliance Upon Pre-Grist Case Law 
The State has argued on appeal that the district court could not have abused its 
discretion for failing to anticipate "the changes to the law as stated in State v. Grist." 
(Respondent's Brief, pp.7-9.) This is a misstatement both of Mr. Truman's assertion on 
appeal and of the pertinent portions of the Grist Opinion that are germane to the issue 
of the district court's admission of prior bad acts evidence against Mr. Truman in this 
case. 
But as an initial matter, and contrary to the State's representation on appeal, 
Mr. Truman has not asserted that "all pre-Grist evidentiary rulings in child sex cases are 
ipso facto abuses of discretion." (Respondent's Brief, p.8.) He has, however, asserted 
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that the district court in this particular case applied erroneous standards for admissibility 
as is evinced by the record of the court's ruling. (Appellant's Brief, pp.19-22.) The 
district court itself specifically noted that it was applying special standards regarding 
I.RE. 404(b) evidence in "child victimization cases." (9/8/08 Tr., p.30, Ls.10-25; p.47, 
L.21 - p.48, L.1.) In addition, the district court indicated that it was relying, in part, on 
the Idaho Court of Appeals' Opinion in State v. Wood for this same holding, which was 
expressly overruled by the Grist Opinion. (9/8/08 Tr., p.33, Ls.11-16.) 
Therefore, Mr. Truman is not challenging the district court's ruling on the 
admissibility of allegations of uncharged conduct under loRE. 404(b) merely because 
the trial court's ruling was prior in time to the Opinion in Grist. Rather, Mr. Truman 
challenges the ruling that this evidence was admissible because the district court based 
its ruling on the exact rationale that was disavowed in the Grist Opinion. (See 
Appellant's Brief, pp.18-22.) 
Turning to the core of the State's contention, contrary to the State's argument, 
the Idaho Supreme Court Opinion in Grist did not articulate a new rule with regard to the 
standards of admissibility at stake in this appeal, but rather corrected an erroneous 
interpretation of LR.E. 404(b) that the Supreme Court never embraced and that never 
was, in fact, the legal standard for the admission of prior bad acts evidence. The Grist 
Opinion rooted its ultimate holding, which the Court characterized as a clarification of 
the law as opposed to a new rule of law, in the traditional common law roots out of 
which loRE. 404(b) emerged. Grist, 147 Idaho at 52, 205 P.3d at 1188. While the 
Idaho Court of Appeals had, before the Grist Opinion, held that special standards 
applied to the admissibility of prior bad acts evidence in child victimization cases, the 
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Grist Opinion was careful to note that this was due to an overly broad, expansive, and 
ultimately incorrect reading of Idaho Supreme Court case law. Id. at 51-55,205 P.3d at 
1187 -1191 (revisiting prior case law that had been "interpreted as creating an exception 
in child sex cases," and clarifying "that the admission of I.RE. 404(b) evidence in a child 
sex case is subject to the same analysis as the admission of such evidence in any other 
case.") As such, the Opinion in Grist did not, as the State appears to argue, create a 
new standard of admissibility for prior bad acts evidence in child sex cases; instead, the 
Grist Court merely corrected an erroneous understanding of the law that had never 
been the proper standard for admissibility under I.RE. 404(b). 
In addition, the State fails to acknowledge in its Respondent's Brief that the Idaho 
Supreme Court and the Idaho Court of Appeals have consistently applied the standards 
articulated in Grist to the district court's determination regarding admissibility of prior 
bad acts evidence in child sex cases, regardless of whether the district court had the 
benefit of this opinion at the time of its initial determination of admissibility under LRE. 
404(b). See, e.g., State v. Johnson, 148 Idaho 664, 668, 227 P.3d 918, 922 (2010); 
State v. Pokorney, _ Idaho _, _ P.3d _, 2010 WL 2105078, *2-5 (Ct. App. 
2010)2; State v. Parmer, 147 Idaho 210, 214-221, 207 P.3d 186, 190-197 (Ct. App. 
2009). In fact, each of these opinions expressly noted that the district court did not have 
the benefit of the Grist Opinion at the time that the trial courts deemed prior bad acts 
evidence to be admissible. Johnson, 148 Idaho at 668, 227 P.3d at 922; Pokorney, 
2010 WL 2105078 at *2; Parmer, 147 Idaho at 215-216,207 P.3d at 191-192. And yet 
2 As of the writing of this brief, the opinion in Pokorney has not yet been released for 
publication in the permanent law reports and may be subject to revision or withdrawal. 
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these cases have all universally applied an analysis of the proper standard for review of 
prior bad acts evidence as articulated in Grist. 
Moreover, to the extent that the State appears to argue that the district court's 
articulation of the legal standards that the court was applying to its determination does 
not also imply that these were the standards actually employed in making the 
determination of whether to admit evidence pursuant to I.R.E. 404(b), such argument 
suffers from illogic.3 (See Respondent's Brief, p.8.) A significant purpose of any district 
court's articulation of the legal standards attendant on its determination is to create a 
record of the standards being actually applied. See, e.g., State v. Payne, 146 Idaho 
548, 574-575, 199 P .3d 123, 149-150 (2008) (vacating defendant's sentence because 
an examination of the district court's oral order and written opinion demonstrated that 
the district court entertained an erroneous belief about the admissibility of certain 
evidence at sentencing). Because the district court clearly articulated that it was 
applying erroneous legal standards in making its I.R.E. 404(b) determination of 
admissibility, the district court abused its discretion in failing to follow the proper legal 
standards attendant on its discretion. 
3 To assume the opposite - that is, that the district court first articulated what it believed 
to be the applicable legal standard and then deliberately ignored or failed to apply it -
would be illogical, as it would require a presumption that the district court made the 
determination to act in an arbitrary manner rather than follow that which the court 
believed to be the law. This would itself constitute an abuse of discretion, as the district 
court would not be reaching its determination through the exercise of reason. See, e.g., 
Johnson, 148 Idaho at 667, 227 P.3d at 918 (articulating standard for abuse of 
discretion) . 
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D. Mr. Truman Is Not Precluded Under The Doctrine Of Invited Error From Raising 
A Challenge On Appeal To The District Court's Admission Of Uncharged Acts 
Evidence Under I.R.E. 404(B) 
The State has argued on appeal that Mr. Truman is precluded under the doctrine 
of invited error from asserting error on appeal regarding the district court's admission of 
prior bad acts evidence against him. However, this claim is predicated on taking some 
of the statements made by trial counsel in regard to the lack of sufficient notice 
regarding the prior bad acts evidence out of the context in which these remarks were 
made. Reading trial counsel's remarks in context, counsel is not conceding the issues 
on appeal as the State is attempting to impute to trial counsel. As such, there was no 
invited error of the particular challenges that Mr. Truman is now making on appeal. 
Under the invited error doctrine, a party is stopped "from asserting an alleged 
error when his own conduct induced its commission." See, e.g., State v. Bagshaw, 137 
Idaho 613, 617, 51 P.3d 427, 431 (Ct. App. 2002). However, mere silence by trial 
counsel on an issue, in the face of an actual ruling by the district court, does not 
constitute invited error. State v. Blake, 133 Idaho 237,240,985 P.2d 117, 120 (1999). 
In addition, a claim of invited error that is predicated on a misstatement of the basis of a 
party's issues on appeal is without merit. State v. Lee, 131 Idaho 600, 605, 961 P.2d 
1203, 1208 (Ct. App. 1998). 
Because the remarks identified by the State that were made by trial counsel were 
in the context of a separate issue with regard to the State's proffered I.R.E. 404(b) 
evidence than that challenged on appeal, there was no invited error in this case. 
From the outset, it is clear that a challenge to the sufficiency of the State's notice 
of its intent to use prior bad acts evidence - including notice of the general nature of 
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that evidence - is a separate issue than the substantive merits of the decision to admit 
or exclude the evidence under I.R.E. 404(b) or I.R.E. 403 based upon the purpose for 
which that evidence is offered and its potential to unfairly prejudice the defendant. 
Under I.R.E. 404(b), the State may be able to introduce other-acts evidence against a 
defendant if, inter alia, the State files and serves notice of its intent to introduce such 
evidence reasonably in advance of trial, or during trial if the district court excuses the 
lack of such notice upon a showing of good cause for the failure to provide such notice. 
I.R.E. 404(b). However, as indicated by the Idaho Supreme Court in State v. Sheldon 
the question of whether the State has provided sufficient notice of its intended I. R. E. 
404(b) evidence is a separate consideration from the ultimate determination of the 
admissibility of that evidence for the particular purpose proffered by the State. State v. 
Sheldon, 145 Idaho 225, 230-231, 178 P.3d 28,33-34 (2008). 
Turning, then, to trial counsel's remarks upon which the State seeks to base its 
invocation of invited error, it is clear from the context of these remarks that the 
comments of defense counsel were directed solely at the question of the sufficiency of 
the State's notice of its intent to introduce prior bad acts evidence - and of the nature of 
the evidence the State sought to introduce - and that these remarks did not embrace 
the separate consideration of whether the State's evidence was presented for a 
permissible purpose and would not result in unfair prejudice to Mr. Truman. 
This context is clear from the opening remarks of Mr. Truman's counsel at the 
motion in limine hearing regarding the State's proposed prior bad acts evidence. Trial 
counsel argued at this hearing that counsel needed: 
to be made aware if the state wants to go into specific instances of 
particular dates or months that the state would be referring to or asking 
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this girl to testify to so I can prepare and rebut, if I may, if I have the 
means to do that, those specific instances. I guess that's what I'm looking 
for. 
(9/8/08 Tr., p.17, Ls.18-25.) 
The same concern regarding sufficiency of the State's notice of the acts it was 
seeking to admit was similarly the context of the remarks that were cited to by the State 
in its assertion of invited error in the paragraph immediately following the portion of the 
transcript selectively provided to this Court by the State. (See Respondent's Brief, 
pp.10-11.) Defense counsel, after discussing what notice would be sufficient in his 
view, then remarked: 
But I just want to make sure that we are clear on that, as opposed to we 
come here during trial, then we get into when she was 11, then two 
months after that, then maybe six months after that, or another ten months 
after that. Because I think it's critical for me to have a notice in advance of 
what I'm dealing with in terms of the specific allegation that the state is 
trying to bring forward, so I can prepare myself to combat those. 
(9/8/08 Tr., p.20, Ls.5-14.) It is notable that these remarks follow immediately on the 
heels of one of the statements that the State has identified in its argument regarding 
invited error, with no separation. (Respondent's Brief, pp.10-11.) In omitting the above-
quoted passage, the State has misconstrued the context and meaning of defense 
counsel's argument, which clearly dealt with the issue of the sufficiency of the State's 
notice of the acts it was seeking to introduce under the auspices of I,R.E. 404(b). 
In a similar vein, the State omits the preceding paragraph from the next set of 
remarks upon which the State seeks to hang its allegation of invited error. (See 
Respondent's Brief, p.11.) In response to trial counsel's arguments regarding the 
sufficiency of the State's notice, the prosecutor remarked: 
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It does provide the defense some notice as to what time frame we're 
looking at and where we're looking at, but it's pretty clear in this report and 
in this information what we're talking about, and approximate ages, and 
time frames that we're working with for these type [sic] of cases. 
(9/8/08 Tr., p.22, Ls.1-7.) From the prosecutor's remarks, it is clear that the parties 
understood that the initial challenge raised by Mr. Truman's trial counsel was to the 
sufficiency of the State's notice. And the remarks that followed by trial counsel 
indicating his agreement with the State were specific to the representations made by the 
prosecutor regarding the degree to which that notice must identify the prior bad acts in 
order to fulfill the separate notice requirement as contained within I.R.E. 404(b). (9/8/08 
Tr., p.20, L.23 - p.23, L.11; see also Respondent's Brief, p.11.) 
As to the final remarks identified by the State in support of its claim of invited 
error, defense counsel made these remarks only after the State identified with more 
specificity the acts that formed the basis of the State's I.R.E. 404(b) motion in limine, 
which had previously only been identified by the State as "prior bad acts by the 
defendant against the charged victim, T.S.," and through the statement that "[t]he 
particulars of the prior bad acts are contained within police reports and other documents 
previously disclosed and in prior testimony taken in this case." (9/8/08 Tr., p.26, L.5 -
p.27, L.25; R., pp.42-43; see Respondent's Brief, pp.11-12.) It is also worth noting that 
the district court's query to trial counsel regarding whether defense counsel had any 
continuing objection was specific to the issue of the "time frame as to what she's going 
to testify," which again reflects that the context of the remarks identified by the State 
arose from the initial objection to the introduction of the State's evidence due to the 
alleged insufficiency of the State's notice. (9/8/08 Tr., p.26, L.23 - p.27, L.6) (emphasis 
added). 
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While Mr. Truman has challenged on appeal the district court's substantive 
determination of the admissibility of prior bad acts evidence given the court's erroneous 
belief that relaxed standards of admissibility apply to child sexual abuse cases and 
because much of this evidence was only relevant to an invalid charge, Mr. Truman has 
not asserted a challenge as to the sufficiency of the State's notice of its intent to 
introduce that evidence. (See Appellant's Brief, pp.18-26.) The sufficiency of the 
State's notice, as required under I.R.E. 404(b), is a separate issue than the substantive 
question of whether other-acts evidence is presented for a permissible purpose and is 
not unduly prejudicial. Sheldon, 145 Idaho at 230-231, 178 P.3d at 33-34. 
Because the remarks identified by the State as constituting invited error only deal 
with the issue of notice, any concession made by trial counsel as to the notice issue is 
not germane to the ultimate determination of admissibility under I.R.E. 404(b) and 403 
based upon the purpose for which other-acts evidence was offered or its potential for 
prejudice. Therefore, there has been no invited error by trial counsel on the issues 
raised by Mr. Truman on appeal. 
E. The I.R.E. 404(B) Evidence In This Case Should Not Be Deemed Admissible By 
This Court In Order To Show The Res Gestae Of The Offense Of Lewd Conduct 
Or To Show A Common Scheme Or Plan 
In its substantive defense of the admission of prior bad acts evidence in this 
case, the State has posited two grounds upon which it claims that the prior bad acts 
evidence at issue in this case could have been properly admitted: res gestae and 
common scheme or plan. (Respondent's Brief, pp.14-19.) Regarding res gestae, this 
theory of admissibility was never raised by the State before the district court and further 
would not apply to most of the other-acts evidence that was admitted at trial. 
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As to common scheme or plan, it would be inappropriate for this Court to make a 
de novo weighing as to whether the prior bad acts evidence would have been deemed 
admissible under a proper application of the standards of I,R.E. 404(b) and I,R.E. 403 
as articulated in Grist, because the trial court never engaged in the careful scrutiny of 
this evidence as offered under "common scheme or plan" evidence and because this 
Court is not the tribunal for this type of fact-driven assessment. Therefore, consistent 
with Grist, a remand to the district court is necessary on this issue. 
The State never asserted to the district court that the prior bad acts evidence it 
was seeking to admit against Mr. Truman was relevant in order to show the res gestae 
of the charged offense of lewd conduct. To the extent that the State is now seeking to 
advance an alternate justification for admission of prior bad acts evidence against 
Mr. Truman for the first time on appeal, the Idaho Supreme Court has recently clarified 
that the State is not permitted to do so. The Court in Johnson, after noting that the 
State was making a separate relevance argument on appeal than that presented at trial, 
held that, "Of course, '[a]ppellate court review is limited to the evidence, theories and 
arguments that were presented below.'" Johnson, 148 Idaho at 670, 227 P.3d at 924; 
see also State v. Frederick, _ Idaho _, _ P.3d _, 2010 WL 2901802, *6 nA 
(2010)4. While the Johnson Court ultimately reviewed the separate relevance argument 
presented by the State on appeal, the Court did so expressly because the prosecutor 
had raised the same claim during trial, and the State's argument was "therefore 
permissible on appeaL" Id. 
4 As of the writing of this brief, the Opinion in Frederick has not yet been released for 
publication in the permanent law reports, and may be subject to revision or withdrawal. 
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The prosecutor at trial never suggested as an alternate theory as to relevance 
that the evidence of uncharged conduct that it was seeking to admit against Mr. Truman 
was proffered for the purpose of res gestae for the offense of lewd conduct. (See 
9/8/08 Tr., generally; R., pp.42-43.) The State is therefore seeking to advance this 
alternate ground for the first time on appeal, which the Idaho Supreme Court in Johnson 
has held is impermissible. Johnson, 148 Idaho at 670,227 P.3d at 924. 
Even if the State's alternate theory was justiciable when raised for the first time 
on appeal, a review of the pertinent case law, including that relied upon by the State for 
its contentions, reveals that the theory of res gestae would not apply to most of the 
other-acts evidence admitted in Mr. Truman's trial. Although the term is used at times 
flexibly, res gestae is generally defined as "the whole transaction under investigation 
and every part of it." State v. Blackstead, 126 Idaho 14, 17, 878 P.2d 188, 191 
(Ct. App. 1994) (quoting BLACKS LAw DICTIONARY 1305 (6th Ed. 1990)). The only valid 
charge in this case - lewd conduct - was alleged to have occurred on or about 
December 5, 2007. (R., p.18.) However, the other-acts evidence admitted at trial 
ranged from a period of years prior to this allegation, and therefore was not part of the 
res gestae of the charged offense. 
This point was recognized by the Idaho Court of Appeals in State v. Blackstead, 
which is the primary authority relied upon by the State in support of its contention that 
the prior bad acts evidence should have been admitted under a theory of res gestae. 
(Respondent's Brief, pp.15-18.) According to the Blackstead Court, res gestae refers to 
events or occurrences that are so related and in such close proximity in time to the 
charged offense that they complete, "the story of the crime on trial by placing it in the 
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context of nearby and nearly contemporaneous happenings." See State v. Blackstead, 
126 Idaho 14, 17-18, 878 P.2d 188, 191-192 (Ct. App. 1994). Generally, events 
occurring at a different time or on a different day do not fall within the res gestae of the 
charged offense; and prior bad acts evidence should be admitted to show res gestae 
only when "the charged act and the uncharged act are so inseparably connected that 
the jury cannot be given a rational and complete presentation of the alleged crime 
without reference to the uncharged misconduct." Id. at 19, 878 P.2d at 193. 
In Blackstead, the only evidence that the court determined constituted res gestae 
was evidence of drug use that was immediately prior in time or contemporaneous with 
the charged offense of lewd conduct - the alleged victim was actually under the 
influence of these substances when the alleged lewd conduct occurred. Blackstead, 
126 Idaho at 16, 878 P.2d at 190. In addition, the Blackstead Court recognized a 
further conceptual limitation on the proper scope of admissibility of res gestae evidence. 
Specifically, this evidence must be so interconnected with the charged offense, "that a 
complete account of the charged offense could not be given to the jury without 
disclosure of the [uncharged acts]." Id. at 18, 878 P.2d at 193. 
The articulation of the res gestae principle given in Washington v. State, 118 
So.2d 650, 653 (Fla. App. 1960), is particularly helpful on this point: 
"Res Gestae," is a Latin term translated literally as "things done"; and it 
embraces circumstances, facts, and declarations which are incident to the 
main facts in the transaction and which are necessary to demonstrate its 
character. It also includes words, declarations, and acts so closely 
connected with a main fact in issue as to constitute part of the transaction. 
Statements or acts of the injured person made or done at the time 
immediately prior to the offense or so near to it as to preclude the idea of 
forethought, and tending to elucidate a fact in issue may be admissible as 
part of the res gestae. Further, the rule is well recognized that statements, 
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exclamations, acts, and conduct of the injured person at a time 
substantially contemporaneous with the offense and so connected to the 
crime as to have a relevant bearing on it may be held admissible as part of 
the res gestae, whether they incriminate the accused or exonerate him. 
Washington, 118 SO.2d at 653 (emphasis added). 
The other-acts evidence at stake in this appeal cannot meet the test for 
admissibility under res gestae. This testimony started at a point when T.S. was several 
years younger - at age 12 according to her testimony - and embraced a time frame 
leading up to the point of weeks prior to charged offense. (Trial Tr., p.266, L.12 - p.285, 
L.25.) Under the standards for res gestae as articulated in Blackstead, this simply does 
not qualify as res gestae evidence. 
Contrary to the State's suggestion, the district court's misapplication of standards 
pursuant to LR.E. 404(b) and LR.E. 403, which are identical to those found to be 
erroneous in Grist, was not limited to the context of the court's relevance determination. 
The misapplication of standards for admissibility of prior bad acts evidence in child sex 
cases also creates issues with regard to the fact-based balancing of probativeness 
versus the potential for unfair prejudice pursuant to LR.E. 403. Grist, 147 Idaho at 53, 
205 P.3d at 1189. 
It is well established that this Court, as an appellate tribunal, does not engage in 
its own fact finding on review. See, e.g., State v. Meister, 148 Idaho 236,239,220 P.3d 
1055, 1058 (2009) (concluding that the appellate courts are not fact-finding tribunals 
and declining to make a determination on the admissibility of the evidence at issue); 
Lynch v. Lynch, 106 Idaho 842, 845-846, 683 P.2d 878, 881-882 (1984) (it is an 
invasion of the province of the trial for an appellate court to readjudicate controverted 
facts); Thomas v. Klein, 99 Idaho 105, 109, 577 P.2d 1153, 1157 (1978) (scope of 
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appellate review is limited, and appellate court will not retry issues of fact or substitute 
its view of such issues for the trial court). 
The balancing process required under I.R.E. 403 is a fundamentally factual one 
that requires the trial court to consider a number of fact-dependant circumstances. See, 
e.g., U.S. v. Garcia, 567 F.3d 721, 727 (5th Cir. 2009); Commonwealth v. Lockcuff, 813 
A.2d 857, 861 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2002). This is consistent with the standard of review 
applied by this Court to admission of I.R.E. 404(b) evidence: this Court reviews the 
determination of relevance, an issue of law, de novo; but applies an abuse of discretion 
standard to the fact-based process of weighing prejudice versus probativeness pursuant 
to I.R.E. 403. See e.g. Sheldon, 145 Idaho at 229, 178 P.3d at 32. Given that the 
district court's erroneous understanding of the extent of relevance of prior bad acts 
evidence in cases involving allegations of child sex crimes, this understanding infected 
both the initial relevance determination under I.R.E. 404(b) and the court's 
understanding of the probativeness of this evidence under I.R.E. 403. See Grist, 147 
Idaho at 53, 205 P.3d at 1189. 
Moreover, the district court did not apply the careful scrutiny required to the facts 
before it in order to determine whether the prior bad acts evidence actually met the 
proper standard for evidence of a common scheme or plan. The district court in this 
case was applying exactly the relaxed standards for "corroboration" and "common 
scheme or plan" that were disavowed in Grist. Because "the trial courts of this state ... 
must carefully examine evidence offered for the purpose of demonstrating the existence 
of a common scheme or plan in order to determine whether the requisite relationship 
exists," and because this determination is inherently a fact-based one, a remand to the 
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district court is necessary for this determination. See Grist, 147 Idaho at 55, 205 P.3d 
at 1191. 
The Grist Court has provided the template for the appropriate remedy where the 
district court makes a ruling of admissibility of evidence in child sex cases, such as this 
one, where the trial court's ruling is predicated on an erroneous understanding of the 
standards regarding prior bad acts evidence: 
As will be discussed in the following section, trial courts must carefully 
scrutinize evidence offered as "corroboration" or as demonstrating a 
"common scheme or plan" in order to avoid the erroneous introduction of 
evidence that is merely probative of the defendant's propensity to engage 
in criminal behavior. Accordingly, we vacate the judgment of conviction 
and remand for a new trial. We do not decide the admissibility of evidence 
at issue in this case. The district court will make that determination on 
remand in exercise of its discretion. 
Grist, 147 Idaho at 53,205 P.3d at 1189. The Grist Court clearly recognized that, as an 
appellate tribunal rather than a trial court, the proper determination of the admissibility of 
evidence where an erroneous standard of admission has been used must lie with the 
trial court itself. As such, this Court should decline the State's invitation to reweigh the 
evidence and present its own conclusions regarding the admissibility of the prior bad 
acts evidence at issue in this case. 
F. The District Court Abused Its Discretion When It Admitted Allegations Of Prior 
Bad Acts Against Mr. Truman That Involved Claims That He Had Engaged In 
Sexual Acts With J.R. Because These Allegations Were Found To Be Relevant 
Only To An Invalid Charge And Because The Prejudice Of This Evidence 
Outweighed Any Potential Probative Value 
In response to Mr. Truman's assertion on appeal that the district court erred in 
admitting evidence of Mr. Truman's alleged sexual activities with J.R., given that these 
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acts were only relevant to a charge that was invalid from its inception, the State asserts 
first that this claim was not preserved for appeal. (Respondent's Brief, pp.19-20.) 
However, this initial assertion ignores the fact that the issue of the relevance and 
admissibility of this evidence was litigated to, and actually decided by, the district court 
and therefore the district court's ruling is properly before this tribunal. Issues that are 
argued to or decided by the trial court are properly reviewable on appeal. See State v. 
DuValt, 131 Idaho 550,553,961 P.2d 641, 644 (1998). Moreover, and contrary to the 
State's allegation, the issue of alleged sexual contact between Mr. Truman and J.R. 
was, in fact, litigated before the district court. (9/8/08 Tr., p.34, L.10 - p.51, L.2.) In 
fact, Mr. Truman expressly challenged the introduction of any evidence of sexual 
contact between himself and J.R., asserting that this evidence would not be relevant to 
whether Mr. Truman had solicited T.S. to film the activity prior to the alleged occurrence 
of the sexual activity. (9/8/08 Tr., p.39, L.8 - p.40, L.7.) 
The district court further held that this evidence could be admitted as 
corroboration of T.S.'s allegations under the rubric of the relaxed standards of 
admissibility in child sex cases. (9/8/08 Tr., p.47, L.21 - p.49, L.16.) Because 
Mr. Truman challenged the introduction of evidence regarding sexual activity between 
himself and J.R., and because the district court very clearly decided the issue of the 
admissibility of the evidence regarding sexual contacts between Mr. Truman and J.R., 
this issue is preserved and properly presented for this Court's review. 
To the extent that the State attempts to argue that evidence of separate sexual 
activity between Mr. Truman and J.R. constitutes proper "corroboration" evidence of the 
charge of lewd conduct, this argument is meritless for three reasons. First, as has been 
21 
noted, the district court was employing an erroneous understanding of what constitutes 
proper evidence of "corroboration" for purposes of I.R.E. 404(b), and the Grist Court has 
held that a remand is appropriate in such circumstances for a proper determination to 
be made. See Grist, 147 Idaho at 53,205 P.3d at 1189. 
Second, the definition of proper "corroboration" evidence being proffered by the 
State on appeal appears to be indistinguishable from the standards of corroboration that 
were rejected by the Grist Court. While acknowledging the definition of "corroboration" 
provided within the Grist Opinion, the State then embraces the rationales that the Grist 
Court took pains to warn against. (Respondent's Brief, p.22.) In arguing that evidence 
of uncharged sexual conduct occurring between Mr. Truman and J.R. corroborated 
facts that occurred on December 5, 2007, when J.R. was never present, the State is 
embracing the notion rejected by the Grist Court that: 
"If the defendant has committed another sex offense, it is more probable 
that he committed the offense for which he is charged, thus reducing the 
probability that the prosecuting witness is lying, while at the same time 
increasing the probability that the defendant committed the crime." The 
unstated premise in Moore is simply this: "If he did it before, he probably 
did it this time as well." This complete reliance on propensity is not a 
permissible basis for the admission of evidence of uncharged misconduct. 
Grist, 147 Idaho at 54, 205 P.3d at 1190 (internal citations omitted). The State's sole 
contention as to the relevance of sexual activity between J.R. and Mr. Truman is that 
this evidence makes it more likely that T.S. was not lying, and therefore added weight to 
her credibility at trial. (Respondent's Brief, pp.21-22.) This is indistinguishable from the 
justifications for establishing credibility rejected in the above-quoted passage in Grist. 
In short, the State in this appeal is merely seeking to revive a standard of admissibility 
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of evidence as "corroboration" in child sex cases that has been laid to rest by the Idaho 
Supreme Court. 
Finally, as was noted in Mr. Truman's Appellant's Brief, even prior to Grist, Idaho 
cases recognized that corroboration of an alleged victim in child sex cases was a 
negligible concern when the alleged victim is in his or her late teens. See, e.g., State v. 
Field, 144 Idaho 559, 570, 165 P.3d 273, 284 (2007); see also Appellant's Brief, p.21. 
Given that T.S. was demonstrable capable of expressing herself and conveying her 
responses to the questions at trial to the jury in an effective manner, there appears to be 
very little to no need for corroboration of her testimony based upon her status as a 
minor. 
II. 
The Prosecutor Committed Misconduct, Rising To The Level Of A Fundamental Error, 
When The Prosecutor Elicited Testimony In Violation Of The District Court's Order That 
Deemed Testimony Regarding J.R.'S Mental Condition Inadmissible Because It Was 
Irrelevant 
The State in this case asserts that the prosecutor did not commit misconduct in 
eliciting evidence regarding the mental condition of J.R. at trial, and that, even if the 
prosecutor did commit misconduct, this misconduct did not rise to the level of a 
fundamental error.5 
5 The Idaho Supreme Court in State v. Perry has recently articulated a change in the 
standards for fundamental error with regard to allegations of prosecutorial misconduct. 
See State v. Perry, _ Idaho _, _ P.3d _,2010 WL 2880156 (July 23,2010). 
However, the Perry Opinion made very clear that these changes would not be given the 
standard retroactive application to cases currently pending on appeal. Perry, 2010 WL 
2880156 at *8 (holding that, "This restatement shall not be given retroactive 
application."). While generally a new rule is applied retroactively to all cases pending on 
direct review or otherwise not yet final, see Frederick, 2010 WL 2901802 at *6 (citing 
Griffith v. Kentucky, 479 U.S. 314, 328 (1987)), the Idaho Supreme Court has expressly 
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As to the first contention, the State characterizes the district court's ruling 
regarding J.R.'s mental condition as limited to a discussion of that evidence regarding 
her capacity to consent to sexual activity. (Respondent's Brief, p.29.) However, a 
review of the district court's ruling does not sustain the interpretation urged by the State. 
The ruling by the district court was that, "the state is not going to be allowed to establish 
the developmental disability of [J.R.] in the testimony of the case." (9/8/08 Tr., p.50, 
Ls.16-19.) By its very terms, the district court's ruling was in no way limited to issues of 
legal capacity to consent to sexual activity, but rather was framed in terms of any 
testimony regarding J.R. having developmental disabilities. 
Perhaps in recognition that the State might eventually need to touch upon 
matters that involved J.R.'s developmental disabilities, the district court then provided 
the State with a clear mechanism for doing so. The district court ruled: 
And I guess the -- my point would be before that comes in any way, if you 
determine that for some reason its inescapable, based on the testimony, 
you should do an offer outside the presence of the jury. If it just can't be 
addressed, you need to make an offer before the judge, who's balancing 
the 403 factors in this case. 
9/8/08 Tr., p.50, L.20 - p.51, L.2 (emphasis added). Because the district court ruled 
that any testimony regarding the developmental disability of J.R. was inadmissible, and 
further provided the State with a clear mechanism to revisit this ruling should the State 
deem evidence of J.R.'s disability to be unavoidable at trial, it was prosecutorial 
departed from this general rule and mandated that the revised standards for 
fundamental error as set forth in Perry do not apply to those cases currently pending on 
appeal when Perry was decided. Mr. Truman filed his Notice of Appeal on February 24, 
2009, and therefore the standards for fundamental error as set forth in Perry are not 
retroactive to his case. (R., p.137.) 
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misconduct rising to the level of a fundamental error for the prosecutor to disregard its 
obligation to seek an offer of proof outside of the presence of the jury prior to 
intentionally eliciting information regarding the developmental disabilities of J.R. See 
a/so State v. Erickson, 148 Idaho 679,683-684,227 P.3d 933, 937-938 (Ct. App. 2010) 
(finding prosecutorial misconduct where the prosecutor presented evidence in violation 
of prior order from the court and where the district court expressly ordered that the State 
would be required to seek a ruling outside the presence of the jury before eliciting the 
challenged evidence). 
The State's second assertion, in which the State asserts that the error in this 
case was harmless, is predicated on a fundamentally flawed premise and therefore 
lacks merit. The sum and substance of the State's argument for harmlessness is that, 
because J.R.'s developmental disabilities were likely apparent to the jurors, any 
misconduct in the prosecutor intentionally eliciting testimony regarding her disabilities 
was harmless. (Respondent's Brief, p.32.) This argument is meritless for two reasons. 
First, as previously noted, J.R.'s testimony was only relevant to an invalid charge 
in this case, and therefore the jury should never have heard her testimony at all in 
relation to the charge of lewd conduct. See Point I(F) supra. But the testimony elicited 
by the prosecutor also went to facts that would not be apparent to the jurors with regard 
to the extent of J.R.'s mental disabilities. 
As was noted in the Appellant's Brief, the prosecutor elicited testimony that 
included the fact that J.R. was in special education classes; that she used to live in an 
"Idaho State School and Hospital," followed by residing with Ms. LaFranier in a personal 
care services home run by the State; and that J.R. required constant adult supervision 
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because "she can't be left alone." (Trial Tr., p.167, L.13 - p.171, L.1.) (See also 
Appellant's Brief, p.29.) None of this information would be apparent solely from the 
jurors' observations of J.R. while she was testifying. For the reasons previously 
articulated in Mr. Truman's Appellant's Brief, the misconduct in this case was blatant 
and highly prejudicial, and this misconduct rose to the level of a fundamental error. 
CONCLUSION 
Mr. Truman respectfully requests that this Court reverse his judgment of 
conviction and sentence and remand this case to the district court for further 
proceedings. 
DATED this 4th day of August, 2010. 
\. 
,--' si~~~~~kitj<L-~ 
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender 
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